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FROM RUNNING TOUCHDOWNS TO RUNNING
AWAY WITH THE CASKET: THORPE V.
BOROUGH OF JIM THORPE
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years' after the introduction of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, (NAGPRA)2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an opinion on
a very unique case, and what is a very important test case in
determining the boundaries of NAGPRA. The story behind Thorpe
v. Borough of Jim Thorpe3 is one of an American sports icon,
Native American traditions, body snatching, and family drama of
the kind seen only in movies. Yes, it is a strange story, but can it
be described as absurd? The term "absurd" holds negative
connotations, both in common and legal contexts. When
something is described as absurd, it is automatically considered
"wildly unreasonable, illogical, or inappropriate," with a
weakened status. Given the circumstances of the case, the Third
Circuit found that to apply NAGPRA would be too far removed
from the original intent of congress and invoked the absurdity
doctrine.5
On June 2, 2014, the petitioners, Thorpe's descendants joined by
Sac and Fox Nation, filed a petition for Certiorari6 with The
Supreme Court of the United States, seeking to overturn the Third
Circuit's holding and prevent the application of the absurdity
doctrine to bar NAPGRA.
1 Jack F. Trope Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. .J. 35,
36(1992).
2 25 U.S.C §§ 3001-3013 (1984).
3 Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2014). See also
Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56590 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
19, 2013).
4 Oxford Dictionary of English 7 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010).
5 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 257.
6 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Amicus Briefs in Support of Cert Petition in Sac &
Fox Nation v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, TURTLE TALK (July 1, 2015),
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2015/07/01 /amicus-briefs-in-support-of-cert-
petition-in-thorpe-v-borough-of-jim-thorpe/.
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Given that, on October 5th, 2015, The Supreme Court declined
to allow Certiorari to hear the petitioner's appeal, the central
argument of this note is that by denying Cert, NAGPRA as a result
will be significantly impaired, and Native American communities
will struggle to successfully lobby federal, or federally supported,
organizations on issues of grave protection and repatriation.'
Such a result will effectively cut short the significant work of
many Native American communities regarding repatriation efforts,
and may seriously harm political relationships and the spiritual
health of indigenous communities. Part I of this note presents
quick backgrounds on the Native American Graves Protection Act
and to the Absurdity doctrine. Part II discusses the saga of Thorpe
v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, and examines the holdings of the
District and Third Circuit courts. Part III analyzes the outcomes
that may result from denial of Cert, and argues that because the
Third Circuit's application of the absurdity doctrine was affirmed,
it will negatively affect future cases involving the application of
NAGPRA. Part IV concludes that while there is merit to the
holding of the Third Circuit, it ignores the broader ramifications of
applying the absurdity doctrine to NAGPRA here, and how it
could significantly impair NAGPRA.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will first provide background information for the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
7 Repatriation is defined as "the return of someone to their own country." See
Oxford Dictionary of English 1505 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010).
Repatriation in a broader sense means to return something to its place of origin.
Cultural repatriation is not unique to NAGPRA and is commonly demonstrated
internationally when countries claim ownership of objects housed in foreign
museums, and act to have them returned. The most infamous example, where
the fight for repatriation is ongoing, would be the Elgin Marbles (also known as
the Parthenon Marbles), currently housed at the British Museum in London,
England. See Natalie Haynes, The Elgin Marbles: Could Returning them be the
Thin Edge of the Repatriation Wedge? INDEPENDENT (Oct. 14, 2014, 12:33
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-elgin-marbles-could-
retuming-them-be-the-thin-end-of-the-repatriation-wedge-9794529.html.
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followed by a discussion of the absurdity doctrine, including the
history of its application by American courts.
A. Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act
In 1990, the first President Bush signed into law the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).8
The law, significant for Native American peoples, provides
nationwide repatriation standards and procedures for the return of
Native American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects,
and objects of cultural patrimony 9 from federal agencies and
federally funded institutions, such as universities or museums.' In
its text, NAGPRA directly addresses federally funded museums,
universities and like institutions as the primary focus for the law;"
case law since the 1990s mostly involves controversies with
museums and universities 2 The law was highly contested when it
was first introduced, and to a certain extent it remains
controversial- especially for museums reluctant to surrender parts
of its collection- but NAGPRA has settled in its role for the most
part.
13
Although NAGPRA is most often thought of as being a law
concerned with cultural heritage preservation, its true intent is
human rights legislation, seeking to empower Native American
peoples so they may honor their dead as their traditions dictate."
Congress viewed NAGPRA as part of its trust responsibility to
Indian tribes and people, and stated specifically: it "reflects the
8 See Trope at 36.
9 Id. at 59.
Io Id. at 37.
25 U.S.C. § 3001 (8). "'Museum' means any institution or State or local
government agency (including any institution of higher learning) that received
Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural
items. Such terms does not include the Smithsonian or any other Federal
agency."
12 See Na lwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw.
1995). See also Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004)
" See Trope at 59.
14 Id.
2015]
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unique relationship between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes and Native Hawaiian Organizations." 5  The trust
responsibility mandates the United States to "adhere strictly to
fiduciary standards in its dealings with Indians."' 6 NAGPRA
reflects this commitment and has foundation in agreements
between museums, scientists, and Native American communities. 7
NAGPRA tries to find balance between the needs of museums and
Native American people by considering the importance of both
western collection practices in today's society, as well as the
spiritual and cultural needs of Native American peoples.18
Furthermore, the law intends to "establish a process that provides
the dignity and respect that [the] Nation's first citizens deserve." 9
NAGPRA requires federal agencies" and museums2 to return
human remains and associated funerary objects upon request by a
lineal descendant, Native American tribe, or Native Hawaiian
organization where the museum or agency itself identifies the
cultural affiliation of the items.22 If no such affiliation is available,
the claiming people can still repossess the object if they can prove,
15 Id. at 60 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3010).
16 Id. (citing FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 485-608
Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
17 Id.
18 id
19 Id. (citing 136 CONG. REC. S17173 (daily ed., Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of
Sen. John McCain)).
20 Id. at 61. The Smithsonian Institution is explicitly exempted from NAGPRA
due to the fact that is was already covered by the National Museum of the
American Indian (NMAI) Act, which was passed by Congress in 1989. The
NMAI Act required the Smithsonian to inventory and assess the cultural origins
of collections potentially affiliated with Native American and Native Hawaiian
peoples. Human remains and funerary objects for which cultural affiliation
could be established were to be offered for return to the appropriate tribal group.
See Tamara Bray, A Clash of World Views, ARCTIC STUDIES CENTER-THE
SMITHSONIAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, http://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/
html/repattb.html, available at Tamara Bray, Repatriation: A Clash of World
Views, 17 ANTHRONOTES 1 (1995).
21 Id.
22 Id.
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by preponderance of the evidence, that they have a cultural
affiliation with the item.23
This overview of NAGPRA is only a brief discussion of what is
a very complex piece of legislation. The focus here is on the
repatriation of human remains, which is at issue in the claim
presented in Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe.
B. The Absurdity Doctrine
The absurdity doctrine permits judges to deviate from even the
clearest of statutory text when a given application would otherwise
produce "absurd" results.24 This practice is supported by Supreme
Court precedent, as demonstrated when the Marshall Court made it
clear that a court's obligation to the text ended when "the absurdity
and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in
rejecting the application."25 Federal courts generally act as strict
agents of Congress, and legislative intent is the foundation of a
court's statutory interpretation.26 The text of a statute is the best
evidence for legislative intent, but sometimes Congress does not
always boil down its intentions to specifics and absolutes because
legislators draft statutes within the constraints of time, foresight,
resources, and unclear language.27 The absurdity doctrine allows
judges to determine whether a statute, applied as written,
contradicts too sharply societal values.2 8 If that is found to be case,
23 Id. at 61-63. Cultural affiliation an be demonstrated through geographical,
kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral
traditional, historical, or other relevant opinion or expert opinion. Congress has
recognized it may be extremely difficult, in many instances, for claimants to
trace an item from modem [Native American] Tribes to prehistoric remains
without some reasonable gaps in the historic or prehistoric record. See also 25
U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4); S. Rep. No. 101-473, at 6 (1990). This is not the case here,
as Thorpe's descendants are informed of where their father's remains are
interred.
24 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388
(2003).
25 Id. (citing Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. 122, 203 (1819)).
26 id. at 2389.
27 Id.
28 Id.
2015]
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the absurd results are understood to reflect imprecise drafting that
Congress could and would have corrected had the issue arose
during the enactment process, and the court is permitted to adjust a
clear statute in a rare case in which court finds that the statutory
text diverges from the legislature's true intent.29 In essence, the
absurdity doctrine rests on the notion that some outcomes are so
unthinkable that the federal courts may safely presume that the
legislators do not foresee those particular results, and if they had,
they could and would have revised the legislation to avoid such
absurd results. 3
III. SUBJECT OPINION: THORPE V. JIM THORPE'S BOROUGH
A. Facts
Jim Thorpe was born "Wa-tha-huk," a member of the Sac and
Fox Nation, in 1889 in what is now Oklahoma.3 A legend in his
own right, Thorpe was a world-class athlete talented at many
sports; he was an Olympian and an inaugural inductee of the Pro
Football Hall of Fame.3" Using his fame from athletics, Thorpe
advocated for Native American rights and was very influential in
affecting change in public perception of Native American
peoples.33
Throughout his lifetime, Thorpe was outspoken about his desire
to be buried on tribal land as required by Sac and Fox religious
tradition.34 Following illness, Thorpe told his son, petitioner
29 Id. at 2394. Courts can look to sources such as the legislative history, other
case law, or the purpose of the statute as a whole.
30 Id. at 2394.
31 Fletcher, supra note 6.
32 Id. at 7-8. At the 1912 Stockholm Olympics, Thorpe won gold in both the
pentathlon and decathlon. Jim Thorpe Medals, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE
OLYMPIC MOVEMENT, http://www.olympic.org/jim-thorpe. In Recognition of
his great football career, he was inducted into the Hall of Fame in its inaugural
year (1963). Hall of Famers-Jim Thorpe, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME,
http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?PLAYERID=213.
33 Id. at 8. Thorpe campaigned against non-Native peoples posing as Native
American extras in Hollywood films.
34 Id.
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William Thorpe, that he wanted his body "returned to sac and fox
country" for his "last rites and burial."35 Thorpe died in 1953.36 At
the time of his death, his sons were serving in the military, and he
was estranged from his third wife, Patsy, who was non-Native
American. "
Two weeks after Thorpe's death, members of the Sac and Fox
Nation and other members of Thorpe's family gathered in
Shawnee, Oklahoma for the traditional Sac and Fox two-day
funeral.38 The funeral, an important religious and social ceremony,
began with the traditional evening feast, but the ritual was never
completed.39 Patsy Thorpe arrived with law enforcement officers
and removed the casket.4 ° This incident is still remembered, over
sixty years later, "as a serious injustice and affront to the Sac and
Fox people."'"
Patsy, after her intrusion upon the funeral and shocking act of
removing Thorpe's remains, then began negotiating with several
institutions and municipalities, exploring possible places to bury
Thorpe's body.4" These places, seeking fame by proxy of the honor
of housing Thorpe's remains, began a bidding war.43 The top
bidders included two economically distressed coal-mining towns
in eastern Pennsylvania, Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk,
that wanted to use Thorpe's body to generate a tourism industry in
the area.44 In exchange, Patsy received $500. 4" Neither Thorpe's
children nor the Sac and Fox Nation were ever consulted during
this period.46
35 Id. (citing William K. Thorpe Aff. 7.) Thorpe had three sons; John
(deceased), William and Richard, all of who were/are petitioners in this case.
36 id.
37 Id. Patsy is also referred to as Patricia in case opinions
38 Id. at 9.
39 id.
40 Id. Because of the interruption to Thorpe's funeral ceremony, it is understood
that Thorpe's soul has not completed its journey to the "other side."
41 id.
42 id.
43 Id. at 10. (citing McCallum, Jack, The Regilding of a Legend, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 25, 1982)).
44 id.
45 Id.
46 id.
2015]
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The two towns of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk, as a
condition of sale, merged into a single municipality named the
Borough of Jim Thorpe.47 An above ground mausoleum was built
to house Thorpe's body and, the towns hoped, to attract tourists.48
Unsurprisingly, things did not go as planned and the anticipated
tourist mecca of the Borough of Jim Thorpe was never realized.
The people of the town were unimpressed, a former Borough
councilman summarized the Borough's attitude: "[a]ll we saw
were dollar signs, but all we got was a dead Indian."49
B. District Court Holding
John Thorpe, Thorpe's youngest son, filed suit against the
Borough of Jim Thorpe in the United District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. " The complaint sought a declaration that
the Borough of Jim Thorpe is subject to NAGPRA and therefore
must inventory Jim Thorpe's Remains." Upon the death of John
Thorpe in 2011, the Sac and Fox Nation, Richard Thorpe and
William Thorpe joined the suit as plaintiffs.52
The plaintiffs and the Borough cross-motioned for summary
judgment regarding the claim at issue: whether the Borough is a
"museum" under NAGPRA and thus subject to the Act's
inventory, notice, and repatriation provisions.53 According to the
District Court, the Borough's status as a "museum" for purposes of
NAGRPA depended on whether it "receive[d] federal funds."54
The plaintiffs claimed that the Borough was the recipient of
47 id.
48 id.
41 Id. at 12.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 id.
53 Id.
54 25 U.S.C. A. § 3001(8): "'museum' means any institution or State or local
government agency (including any institution of higher learning) that receives
Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural
items." Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, No. 14-1419, 44a (U.S. June 2, 2015), available at Fletcher, supra note
6.
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"federal funds" in at least four instances, including: (1) a federal
grant under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
to replace water meters within the Borough; (2) federal relief
grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency; (3)
yearly grants funded by the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant;
and (4) a Bond Purchase Agreement administered by PENNVEST
(Pennsylvania's Infrastructure body) to finance improvements to
the Borough's public water system facilities.55 Although this
funding was not directly related to the mausoleum housing Jim
Thorpe's body, the court found the plaintiffs assertions that the
NAGPRA "federal funds" requirement can be satisfied by direct or
indirect56 receipt of funds from the Federal government to be
persuasive.57
The district court ruled in the plaintiffs favour and held that the
Borough was a local government agency that received federal
funding and possessed cultural items and thus was a "museum?'
under NAGPRA.58 The court determined that the body of Jim
Thorpe should be returned to his children and to Sac and Fox
Nation.59 The Borough appealed.
C. Circuit Court Holding
The Third Circuit reversed the holding of the District Court.6" It
acknowledged that the District Court's result was required by the
55 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 45a, Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 136
S. Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419).
56 The term "museum" is broad. It means any institution receiving federal funds
after November 16, 1990 which has possession or control over Native American
cultural items. NAGPRA applies even if the museum itself has not directly
received federal funding as long as the museum is part of a larger entity (such as
a local government or college) which has received federal funds. See NAGPRA
Compliance, Association on American Indian Affairs, http://www.indian-
affairs.org/nagpra-compliance.htmi
57 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 46a.
58 Id. at 12-13
59 Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56590 at *54
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).
60 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 13.
2015]
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"literal application of the text of NAGPRA" and that courts should
ordinarily "look to the text" to interpret a statute, but according to
the Third Circuit, applying NAGPRA "regardless of the
circumstances surrounding possession" would contravene
"Congress's intent to exclude situations such a Thorpe's burial in
the Borough," where the next of kin (albeit estranged) had chosen
the body's resting place.6" The court determined that the
mausoleum was not a museum because it was not holding or
collecting the remains for the purposes of display62 or study, but
were instead serving as an original burial site.63 Furthermore,
NAGPRA requires that remains be "returned;" this assumes that
the human remains were removed from their intended final resting
place. The circuit court emphasized that Thorpe was buried in the
Borough by his wife, and she had the legal authority to decide
where he would be buried. Therefore, there was nowhere for
Thorpe to be "returned."64
The Third Circuit found that allowing the Sac and Fox Nation
and Thorpe's children to remove Thorpe's remains, with the intent
of burying him elsewhere according to religious tradition, was
"such a clearly absurd result and so contrary to Congress's intent"
that the Borough was not a museum "for the purposes of Thorpe's
Burial."65
D. Petition for Certiorari
The petition for writ of Certiorari presents several relevant
arguments to The Supreme Court of the United States for why it
should reconsider and dismiss the Third Circuit's holding. The
petitioners' assertions state that a) NAGPRA's definition of
"museum" does not turn on how an entity acquired possession of
Native American Remains,66 and b) the Third Circuit court
61 Id.
62 Given the acknowledged intent behind the creation of the mausoleum, and
the surrounding space, it's arguable that the mausoleum was intended to display
Thorpe's remains- although they are not visible to the public.
63 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 22a.
64 id
61 Id. at 13.
66 Id. at 15.
10
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misapplied the absurdity doctrine.67 The assertion that is the
primary focus of the legal argument of this Note is that the Third
Circuit's misuse of the absurdity doctrine threatens NAGPRA's
future, and raises federalism concerns.68 The Supreme Court
denied to comment on the holding of the lower courts, and thereby
affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit. This has likely left
many Native American organizations and supporters concerned for
the future application and effectiveness of NAGPRA, and many
Federally supported institutions relieved that their burden under
NAGPRA has arguably been lessened.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section assesses the holding and rationale of the Third
Circuit decision and its inevitable impact, and possible
consequences, on future NAGPRA cases and the repatriation
efforts of Native American communities.69 First, the statutory
language of NAGPRA will be examined to argue that although a
mausoleum is not expressly included into the text, it is not
precluded from status as a "museum" especially as it is maintained
with federal funds and attracts visitors much like a museum
housing only one object, Jim Thorpe's body. Secondly, the
application of the absurdity doctrine by the Third District here will
be compared with other, more appropriate, applications of the
doctrine, to demonstrate why, based on the facts of the case, the
doctrine is inappropriate. Finally, this Note will suggest that by
applying the absurdity doctrine, the court is manipulating the
legislature to an extent not intended by congress and is negatively
affecting the future validity of the law by degrading it in the minds
of both those most reliant on the law, and those most opposed to it.
67 Id. at 16.
68 Id. at 22.
69 While the primary focus of the this note is to discuss the legal ramifications,
it is also important to acknowledge the immense social and spiritual
ramifications that could occur should NAGPRA in this case be upheld as
absurd. It could work to invalidate people's perception of the legislature,
thereby weakening its strength as an enabler for Native American communities
and break down relationships, or prevent future relationships, between Native
American communities and federally funded museums or like institutions.
2015]
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A. Is a Mausoleum a "Museum " under NA GPRA?
NAGPRA defines "museum" very broadly as "any institution or
state or local government agency (including any institution of
higher learning) that receives federal funding and has possession
of, or control over, Native American cultural items,7 ° including
human remains.71 The legislation does not mandate that the
museum must be a certain size or quality to be subject to
NAGPRA's provisions, nor must it necessarily operate under the
title of a museum as long as it functions as such. Simply because
"mausoleum" is not expressly included as an example of a
"museum," this does not mean it is prohibited. A basic, and well
recognized, definition of "museum" is a "building in which objects
of historical, scientific, artistic, cultural interest are stored and
exhibited."" It is very clear that the mausoleum where Jim Thorpe
is interred functions as a "museum" under both the common
understanding and the NAGPRA definition, and treating entities
such as the Borough as a "museum" comports with the ordinary
understanding of that term.73
Jim Thorpe's remains continue to be interred in an above ground
mausoleum surrounded by decorative motifs dedicated to his
history as an athlete, and intended to attract travellers to the area.7 4
Throughout history, the remains of Native American individuals
have been considered objects and have been valued for their
historical, scientific, and cultural value. The Borough, when they
purchased Thorpe's body, did so with the express purpose of
harnessing Thorpe's cultural interest and exploiting his body for
financial gain by creating a public and permanent exhibition of his
remains.
The Borough is a local government that maintains Jim Thorpe's
burial site.75 The District Court found that the Borough is a
70 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8).
" § 3001(3).
72 Oxford Dictionary of English 1167 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010).
73 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 15.
74 Greg Brown, Grave of Jim Thorpe, ROADSIDE AMERICA (March 24, 2001),
roadsideamerica.com.
75 Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2014).
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museum because the record showed the Borough received federal
funds after the enactment of NAGPRA 6 The Circuit court,
however, found that the Borough was not a "museum" as intended
by NAGPRA.77 The court's opinion, while considering both the
literal reading of the text and the guiding intentions of the drafters,
failed to explain what the Borough lacked to prevent it from
aligning with NAGPRA's definition of "museum." 78
Although cities can and do qualify as "museums" under
NAGPRA, perhaps instead of addressing whether the Borough
itself constituted a museum, the Third Circuit should have instead
focused on the site of the mausoleum, or the mausoleum itself, as a
museum. There is very little case law addressing contested views
on what can be defined as a "museum" for the purposes of
NAGPRA, nor are there test cases that push the boundaries of the
textual definition, such as we find here. In Brown v. Hawaii, the
plaintiff asserted that the Hawaiian State Historic Preservation
Department (SHPD) qualified as a "museum" given that the SHPD
receives two federal grants in connection with its programs, and
through the administration of its historical preservation program,
the SHPD of Hawaii is in possession of Native Hawaiian human
remains.79 This was sufficient for the court to find that the SHPD
was subject to NAGPRA and was required to meet NAGPRA's
notification and content requirements for inventories." It has
already been determined that under NAGPRA, federal funding
does not need to be directly given to the "museum" in question,8 '
but instead must merely be awarded to the managing state, town or
in this case, a Borough.
76 Id. at 263.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 265
79 Brown v. Hawaii, No. 07-00556, 2009 WL 3818233, at *2 (D. Haw. Nov. 13,
2009)
80 Id. at 3.
81 Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56590, at *43
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013)
2015]
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B. Misapplied Absurdity Doctrine Issue
The Third Circuit applied the absurdity doctrine to the facts of
the case because it determined that the "rule of statutory
construction is not an inviolable commandment that we must
blindly enforce regardless of surrounding circumstances or the
practical results of rigidly applying the text a given situation"82 and
that "courts may look behind a statute only when the plain
meaning produces a 'result that is not just unwise but is clearly
absurd."' 83
The court concluded that it was confronted with an unusual
situation in which the literal application of NAGPRA would
"produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters."84 The court then looked beyond the text of NAGPRA to
identify the intentions of the drafters of the statute,85 and held that
because Thorpe's remains were located at their final resting place
and had not been disturbed,86 applying NAGPRA to his burial in
the Borough was "such a clearly absurd result and so contrary to
Congress's intent to protect Native American burial sites" that the
Borough could not be held to the requirements of NAGPRA as a
museum.
87
Are the circumstances of this case truly exceptional from other
NAGPRA cases where plaintiffs fight for a court's recognition of
remains as those of lineal ancestors? Or fight to have the courts
protect ancestral burial land from urban development? Is the case
of Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe so exceptional that following
the text of NAGPRA would clearly "thwart" legislative intent and
that the courts may invoke the absurdity doctrine to set aside a
statute's plain meaning?88 It is apparent that the Third Circuit
82 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 263.
83 United States v. Terlingo, 327 F. 3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003).
84 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 264.
85 Id.
86 Cert petition details numerous occasions where Thorpe's remains had been
disturbed- including one such occurrence where the mausoleum was opened and
it was found that Thorpe's head had a plastic bag wrapped around it. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 11.
87 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 266.
88 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (U.S. 1982)
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thought so, but their account does not consider the fact that the
history of collecting Native American remains is itself convoluted
and rife with inhumane, unethical and illicit behavior.89 So in that
way, the fact that there were and are any Native American remains
in museum collections is arguably absurd, at least under the
common understanding of the term. Nor should it be surprising
that there will be Native American human remains located in
places that fall outside of NAGPRA's definition of "museum,"
which was intended by congress to be read broadly. In 1819, Chief
Justice Marshall observed that a court should invoke the absurdity
doctrine only if the text-based results were "so monstrous, that all
mankind would, without hesitation," reject it.9" That is not the case
here.
The appropriate use of the absurdity doctrine is best exemplified
by clear examples of improper use of a statute to a scenario
unforeseen by the drafters or obviously beyond the scope of the
text. Such examples include an ordinance "providing whoever
[draws] blood in the streets should be punished with utmost
severity" could not have been intended to condemn a doctor who
must perform emergency surgery in public.9' Nor could a federal
statute that prescribes criminal punishment for anyone who "shall,
knowingly and willfully, obstruct... the passage of mail,"92 have
intended to punish a police officer for arresting a homicidal postal
carrier in the midst of his rounds.93
The Third Circuit, rather than seriously analyze NAGPRA's
text, or the reasons Congress might have drafted the text as it did,
immediately presents the absurdity doctrine as the best means to
resolve the plaintiffs claim.94 The Third Circuit misapplied the
absurdity doctrine. Applying NAGPRA to entities that acquired
remains from a relative of a deceased person does not thwart
89 Jack F. Trope Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992).
90 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat). 122, 202-203 (1819).
91 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2402
(2003) (citing United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868)).
92 Id. (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, §9, 4 Stat. 102, 104.)
93 Id. (citing United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868)).
94 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 26.
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Congress's purposes behind the legislature.95 Instead, if upheld, the
Third Circuit's decision that will thwart Congress's goal of aiding
Native American peoples as they seek to repatriate their
ancestors.96 By not adhering to the statutory text and Congress's
goal in enacting it, the Third Circuit substituted its own views
about NAGPRA's purposes and rested its decision on two
misunderstandings.97 First, NAGPRA was not designed to ensure
the equal treatment of all human remains, but was intended to
champion Native American remains.98 Second, although Patsy
Thorpe was legally authorized to determine where her (estranged)
spouse would be buried, NAGPRA does not generally support the
wishes of non-Native next-of-kin to trump the expressed interests
of the Native American deceased, his Native American
descendants, or tribal leaders in choosing the final resting place of
their tribal members.99 Congress gave lineal descendants and
Native American tribes, through NAGPRA, priority to make those
decisions.' 0 Therefore, under NAGPRA, a next-of-kin's state-law
ability to determine the disposition of the body is irrelevant to
NAGPRA's repatriation process. 1 '
C. Creating Future Issues for NAGPRA
While NAGPRA is not perfect,0 2 since its enactment in 1990 it
is generally regarded as a very successful piece of legislature that
9' Id. at 19.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 20.
98 See 25 U.S.C. § 3003
99 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 21.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 The issues with NAGPRA legislation depends on who you talk to. The
overarching problem areas seem to be 1) cultural affiliation by multiple tribes,
2) culturally unidentifiable human remains, and 3) the need for scientific
inquiry. These points can be interpreted from various different viewpoints,
resulting in different outcomes. Native American communities, Western
scientific organizations, and Museum institutions have sought clarification at to
the three areas at issue in NAGPRA. See Keith Kintigh, Request for Legal
Review of Critical Issues in the Implementation of NAGPRA, SOCIETY FOR
AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY, http://www.saa.org/AbouttheSociety/
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has lead to the recovery of over 16,000 sets of human remains by
Native American tribes. '0' The Third Circuit's holding, as
affirmed by The Supreme court, will endanger NAGPRA's
continuing viability and lend support to institutions which already
resist cooperating with Native American tribes on issues of
repatriation, and search for loopholes to their compliance to
NAGPRA.
There are institutions that openly disagree with NAGPRA's
fundamental principles and seek to dismantle it.' °4 The most
prevalent argument presented by these universities or museums is
that they need the remains for scientific, or archaeological inquiry
and that should take precedent over the burial traditions of the
claiming Native American community. Between 1990 and 2014,
the Department of the Interior's NAGPRA division found twenty-
four instances of non-compliance by federally funded museums,
universities or similar institutions. 1
0 5
By exempting the Borough from museum status and setting a
determination for how Native American bodies need to have been
obtained in order for the statute to apply, the Third Circuit created
a broad exception to NAGPRA, providing an easy means of abuse
for institutions seeking to resist compliance.' 6 The Third Circuit
has exempted museums based on the circumstances surrounding
their acquisition of remains.' °7 Now, if a museum has acquired
remains under seemingly legal circumstances, they can rely on the
Third Circuit opinion to unilaterally exempt itself from
NAGPRA's inventory and notice provisions. 8 This would mean
that Native American tribes would not have knowledge of
potential ancestral remains located in federally funded institutions,
and would not be able to challenge those museums for repatriation
of the remains.
Repatriationlssues/CriticallssuesNAGPRA033104/tabid/220/Default.aspx
103 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 23.
104 id.
'o' Id. at 23-24.
'06 Id. at 24.
107 id.
108 Id. at 25.
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It is the human repercussions that will be the gravest if the court
of appeal's decision is not overturned. Many communities rely on
NAGPRA to reconnect family members and to give the deceased
the honor they deserve. By creating a loophole by which museums
can choose not disclose their collections of human remains, based
on how they were acquired, the Third Circuit is throwing a wrench
into what is already a very difficult task. The repatriation of human
remains, funerary objects, and sacred cultural items is emotionally
and spiritually taxing to Native American communities, and
federally funded institutions should be respectful of this, even in
light of their own reservations or indigence to complying with
NAGPRA standards.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unclear why The Supreme Court declined to grant Certiorari
to the petitioners as the decision was handed down without
comment. However, one can speculate on the many possible
reasons that the petition was denied. The argument for denial that
seems most persuasive, and most disheartening when considering
the broad ramifications of The Supreme Court's deference to the
Third Circuit, is that the Justices agreed with the sentiment of the
Third Circuit that "NAGPRA was not intended to be wielded as a
sword to settle familial disputes within Native American
Families."10 9 In reality, this viewpoint is too simplistic in the face
of the much more complicated history of Western collecting of
Native American human remains. Thorpe v. Borough of Jim
Thorpe is a demonstration of this collecting practice that the
general population does not know how to respond to because its an
unusual situation; in that Jim Thorpe's remains have been
commoditized and been made to be an attraction, removed from
the sterile and scientific confines of a traditional museum. The
Supreme Court chose to lose an excellent opportunity for The
Court to clarify the meaning and application of NAGPRA in
unusual or uncommon circumstances.'10 The very least that can be
hoped for is that The Supreme Court was able to see beyond the
109 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 265.
110 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 26.
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family history and did find a compelling reason for upholding the
Third Circuit's holding, without dismissing the claim for its
personal complications. An interesting question to consider is how
The Supreme Court would respond if this case occurred today,
without the 50 years of family drama, and whether that would
affect their response to the Third Circuit's application of
NAGPRA.
What options are available to the Sac and Fox Nation and the
Thorpe family? They are now without federal judicial remedy, and
given that cooperation from the Borough after all these years is
highly unlikely, Jim Thorpe's body with have to remain interred
where it currently lies. "' Going forward, these cases may be very
rare, but there is the possibility that other such cases will crop up
where the situation of Native American remains possessed in
circumstances outside of the textual limitations of NAGPRA is
revisited."2 This is especially true as Native American peoples
look overseas to international repositories to search for their
ancestors." 3 Concurrently, while communities and organizations" 4
assert their rights abroad, the highest American court has, by
upholding the Third Circuit's interpretation of NAGPRA, made
repatriation more difficult to realize domestically. In the coming
years, it will be valuable to note whether this decision causes the
number of NAGPRA claims brought forward to Federally funded
institutions to decline in number.
Madelaine Thomas*
...JId. at 27.
112 In this instance, if the claims are brought before other federal District and
Circuit Courts other the Third Circuit, the judgments on the matter may result in
a circuit split- prompting The Supreme Court to reconsider its position on
granting Cert, should a proposal be put forth sometime in the future.
113 NAGPRA, although it is a domestic law, carries significant weight
internationally. Many Native American communities are looking to repatriate
from European collections, and although NAPGRA does not apply in those
circumstances, it is used by communities to exemplify the forward-thinking of
the United States, and how other countries should engage with indigenous
peoples and their ancestral remains.
114 Association on American Indian Affairs International Repatriation Project
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